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Abstract— The study of how to set up cryptocurrency incentive 
mechanisms and to operationalize governance is token economics. 
Given the $250 billion market cap for cryptocurrencies, there is 
compelling need to investigate this topic. In this paper, we present 
facets of the token engineering process for a real-life 80-person 
Swiss blockchain startup, Insolar. We show how Insolar used 
systems modeling and simulation combined with cryptocurrency 
expertise to design a mechanism to incentivize enterprises and 
individual users to use their new MainNet public blockchain 
network.  The study showed subsidy pools that incentivize 
application developers to develop on the network does indeed have 
the desired positive effect on MainNet adoption. For a startup like 
Insolar whose success hinge upon how well their model 
incentivizes various stakeholders to participate on their MainNet 
network versus that of numerous alternatives, this token 
economics simulation analysis provides invaluable insights. 
Keywords—Token economics, token engineering, 
cryptocurrency, blockchain, agent-based modeling and simulation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The core premise of blockchain is straightforward: rather 
than relying upon a trusted intermediary to proprietarily 
maintain one ledger of transactions between members of a 
network, allow all members to maintain their own copies of the 
same ledger and ensure that all copies are synchronized. This 
obviates the need for the intermediary, who often exploits its 
information asymmetry advantage to act in extractive, 
inefficient, or corrupt ways. A key challenge of this 
decentralized design is incentives. Even when not behaving 
exploitatively, the intermediary is well-incentivized to provide 
centralized services in the form of transaction fees (e.g. Visa or 
Mastercard), fees charged for data analysis (e.g. Google), and 
finder’s fees (e.g. Uber) [1]. When such services are provided in 
a decentralized way, an alternative scheme for incentives is 
needed. 
For instance, the Bitcoin network design mitigates the 
“double spend” problem where a sender simultaneously sends 
money that they cannot fully cover to two different recipients 
[2]. The network ensures that one recipient is designated to be 
the rightful recipient and nullifies the money transfer to the 
other. A third party that is neither the sender nor recipient 
verifies this designation. That third party must be incentivized 
to verify accurately and not collude with the sender or the 
recipient. Roughly every ten minutes, the network selects a 
“miner” to add the next block to the Bitcoin blockchain, where 
the block is comprised of all transactions logged since the last 
block formation that are verified by the miner to not be “double 
spent.” Currently, a miner receives 12.5 bitcoins, or roughly 
$125,000 each time a new block is added. 
We have thus simplistically described Bitcoin’s token (or 
crypto) economic model. The model lays out the mechanism by 
which the Bitcoin economy is sustained: Senders and recipients 
are assured that money cannot be transferred from insufficient 
funds and third-party miners are incentivized by the promise of 
receiving (“mining for”) bitcoins to provide this assurance.  
Bitcoin constitutes an example where token economics is “in 
the protocol.” That is, bitcoins – the network’s tokens – are 
automatically transferred by programmatic rules, and in so 
doing, the network properly incentivizes stakeholders to 
collectively behave to sustain its operations. Contrastingly, 
platforms such as Hyperledger Fabric and R3’s Corda do not use 
cryptocurrencies to effect stakeholder behavior. Rather, these 
platforms are meant for use in private networks and use 
traditional group policies “outside the protocol.” Private 
network partners are usually familiar with each other and 
transact on an ongoing basis; they are inclined to adhere to 
policies that will sustain their relationships in and outside of the 
private blockchain. 
In this paper, we present a real-life study conducted to 
develop an “in the protocol” token economics model for Insolar, 
an 80-person blockchain startup headquartered in Switzerland 
with offices in five countries. Insolar conducted an Initial Coin 
Offering (ICO) of their cryptocurrency in December 2017 and 
raised $42 million [3]. As they are about to launch their public, 
permissionless, blockchain – the Insolar MainNet – they sought 
to update their model using applied systems dynamics modeling 
and simulation. The simulation study led to insights, which were 
incorporated into a multi-stakeholder token economics model 
that complements their updated business model.  
We believe that the opportunity to investigate a novel real-
world application such as token economics modeling provides 
rare and contributory visibility to the academic community. To 
that end, our paper is presented as follows. In the next section, 
we provide related literature, and briefly describe how a token 
economics model is engineered. Then, we further describe 
Insolar and detail their specific requirements for token 
economics modeling. We then present an excerpt of the 
simulation study and results related to mechanisms for a 
“subsidy pool,” an incentive program to subsidize third parties 
who provide applications for user to execute on the MainNet. 
Finally, we provide concluding remarks about how the 
simulation informed Insolar’s design of the token economics 
mechanism and provide general insights about cryptocurrencies 
and token economics.   
II. BACKGROUND 
We put forth that there are two distinct streams of academic 
literature regarding designing micro-economies of blockchain-
based cryptographic tokens. The first is an economist’s 
perspective as seminally presented in [4]; the primary author, 
Christian Catalini, is the current Chief Economist for the 
Facebook-sponsored Libra cryptocurrency system. Some works 
study incentives specifically for cryptocurrency miners [5]–[7]. 
Others have studied incentives for various stakeholders in token-
based  platforms like speculative [8],[9] and utilitarian [10] 
cryptocurrency investors, platform users [11], and distributed 
application developers [12]. As would be expected, closed-form 
economics models underlie this perspective. Even those that 
apply more nuanced dynamical models  [13], [14] generally 
eschew complex multi-stakeholder analysis in favor of closed-
form economics models. Other complementary works include a 
bibliometric survey of token economics [15] and token 
economics applied to specific industries [16].  
A contrasting perspective that focuses on the systematic 
development of token-based economies [17][18] is sometimes 
referred to as token engineering. Note that this is the process for 
token modeling, not the larger software engineering process that 
leads to the blockchain system itself. The outputs of the token 
engineering process are models, results, and documentation that 
are implemented in the blockchain system. A key difference vis-
à-vis the economics perspective is that multi-stakeholder models 
can be produced via token engineering through use of simulation 
models that handle complexity albeit without elegant closed-
form solutions. 
In particular, the predominant simulation technique 
employed for token engineering, in addition to game 
theoretically based models [19], [20], is Agent-Based Modeling 
(ABM) [18]. For instance, ABM of network dynamics 
analytically shows that Bitcoin network’s specific token model 
leads the network to a stable, self-sustaining state [21] and  other 
efforts simulate the rich nuances of the Bitcoin trading market 
[22], [23]. For extensions to other cryptocurrency and 
blockchain design, many efforts have produced generalized 
frameworks and simulation environments. They include 
LUNES-blockchain [24], BlockSci [25], Blocksim [26], 
Simblock [27], MIT’s BASIC [28], and cadCAD [29]. For non-
Bitcoin contexts, we discover that these efforts generally focus 
on ABM to simulate technical features of blockchain consensus 
mechanisms and throughput and assume an underlying token 
economics model.  Our work is unique insofar as it uses 
simulation to design different features of an economic model 
and provides details of such simulations in an academic 
publication. We could speculate that crypto startups do not wish 
to divulge such information or are not interested in publicly 
presenting such work even if they have undertaken it. 
Regardless, providing a worked through example as we do in 
this paper appears then to be a novel contribution.  
For our work of designing Insolar’s token economic system, 
we use cadCAD [29], which entails conceptualizing the token 
design problem as a differential game problem in which state 
variable values evolve over time according to some differential 
equations. Since mathematical modeling for a complex scenario 
– as is described for Insolar in Figure 1 – is intractable, the 
conceptualization must first be modeled graphically to 
especially show feedback mechanisms between key 
components. 
 
Figure 1: All feedback mechanisms in Insolar MainNet 
III. MODELING INSOLAR’S TOKEN ECONOMY 
Similar to the Ethereum model, individuals and small 
enterprises can use the Insolar MainNet as a public, 
permissionless blockchain for a per transaction fee. Insolar also 
has a complementary model that does not involve tokens: For a 
fee in fiat currency, Insolar can design and operate a private 
blockchain for enterprises in a business network. For instance, 
Insolar developed a social lending and payment platform for 
Visa in Africa. Insolar is involved in other projects in renewable 
energy, supply chain management, and mining and natural 
resources. 
However, in this paper, our focus is the MainNet. In the 
following table, we summarize the stakeholders and their roles 
in the MainNet as modeled in Figure 1 and describe what 
characteristics the right token economics model would achieve 
for these roles [30]. 
TABLE I.  ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS WITHIN THE INSOLAR TOKEN 
ECONOMICS MODEL TYPE STYLES 
Stakeholder Role in token economic model 
The token economics model 
should:  
SME 
Consumer 
(Individual 
and 
enterprise 
users) 
• Pays application user fees to 
Application Developers 
• Provide predictable fee 
structure 
• Assure predictable quality 
of application 
performance 
Broker(s) 
• Converts fiat currency to 
XNS Coins (MainNet’s 
cryptocurrency) and pays 
Application Developers on 
behalf of the SME Consumer 
• Ensures “money supply” 
for MainNet 
Application 
Developers 
• Develop and deploy Apps 
(smart contracts) and receive 
fees for their usage 
• Pays “rent” for executing 
applications and using 
hardware resources to Insolar 
Foundation as Application 
Platform and Resource 
Platform fees, respectively 
• Also pays Resources Fees to 
Resource Providers, which in 
part is used to pay Stake 
Rewards to XNS holders 
• Provide sufficient 
consumer base and 
resource capacities 
• Assure performance 
quality of Resource 
Providers consistent with 
Service Level 
Agreements (SLA’s) 
Resource 
Providers 
• Provide hardware capacities 
(telecom, CPU, database) as 
a Node on the MainNet for 
running applications and 
receive fees for this 
provision 
• Pay Staking Rewards to 
XNS Holders 
• Provide stable and 
predictable income for 
Resource Providers 
Coin holders 
• Provide XNS coins for 
staking as collateral behind 
the SLA’s and receive 
Staking Rewards. 
• Provides stakes to Resource 
Providers, who in turn 
extend insurance to 
Application Developers 
•  
• Provide sufficient staking 
demand from Resource 
Providers 
Insolar 
Foundation 
• Collects Application 
Platform and Resource 
Platform Fees and also 
provides subsidies to 
Application Developers and 
Resource Providers to 
incentivize participation 
• Create a large 
Application Developer 
community 
• Create a large hardware 
resource market 
• Attract enterprises to use 
Insolar MainNet 
• Maintain and improve the 
platform 
 
Here are some further clarifications. 
• Whereas Bitcoin and Ethereum are peer-to-peer 
networks that do not pay those that provide CPU cycles, 
bandwidth, or databases, such Resource Providers are 
paid in the MainNet. Miners do expend exorbitant 
amount of resources but that constitutes more of an 
indirect provision, where contribution is not necessarily 
proportional to the reward.  
• Coin holders provide their XNS’s to maintain consensus 
in the network via staking. Whereas in Bitcoin and 
Ethereum networks, miners receive tokens to maintain 
consensus throughout the blockchain (Proof-of-Work), 
coin holders that have “skin in the game” vote to ensure 
consensus (Proof-of-Stake). By ensuring that there is a 
trustworthy consensus mechanism, coin holders/stakers 
provide confidence to SME Consumers, Application 
Developers, and Resource Providers, in turn ensuring 
stability for their coin investments. The coins that are 
staked serve as a source of insurance for the MainNet: If 
Application Developers or Resource Providers violate 
Service Level Agreements (SLA’s) with each other, 
coins from the pool of staked funds can be used to pay 
the rightfully aggrieved party. Stakers in turn are 
rewarded a staking fee – an investment income, akin to 
interest, earned from leaving their staked funds 
unwithdrawn.  
• Not only should the operation of the MainNet be 
decentralized, so should its governance. A MainNet 
governed exclusively and in perpetuity by Insolar is not 
desirable. Instead, a governance foundation, similar to 
those that underlie the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks 
and one in which in the long run Insolar is one of many 
members, is needed. 
IV. SIMULATING INSOLAR’S TOKEN MODEL: APPLICATION 
DEVELOPER SUBSIDY  
A. System Simulation Model 
The token modeling process starts with a specification of the 
overall system model, which is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Overall System Simulation Model for Insolar 
B. State Transition Model 
Although Insolar conducted an extensive study addressing 
all multiple parties1, we highlight one facet to bound the scope 
of this paper: how to incentivize pioneering Application 
Developers to contribute applications when the MainNet is 
nascent and network effect has not been achieved yet. The black-
outlined excerpt in Figure 1 is a diagram for this excerpt and 
transitions of states within this excerpt are modeled below in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Transition of State Variables for Insolar (Application 
Subsidy Excerpt)2 
C. Specification of State Variables 
The table below provides a simplified formal specification 
of the excerpted state variables. 
TABLE II.  FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF STATE VARIABLES FOR INSOLAR 
(APPLICATION SUBSIDY EXCERPT) 
Variable Formal specification  
App 
Subsidy 
Pool 
The number of XNS’s distributed to developers at time t, 
A(t), through the App Subsidy is governed by the initial 
reward pool size A0, and the exponential decay rate λ. Thus, 
• 
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜆 ∙ 𝐴,                         (1) 
Number 
of Apps 
(App 
Usage) 
Number of apps at time t, U(t), grows at an exponential 
growth rate β(t) from an initial count N0. The growth rate is 
parametrized to t, β(t), whereas the App Subsidy decay rate λ 
is constant. We recognize that number of apps is dependent 
minimally on numbers of users and developers and other 
factors. However, we simplify this complex interaction by 
updating β(t) that captures this interaction every time step j 
as a function solely of app income. This parameter is tuned 
at the discretion of the modeler, and not necessarily based on 
formal rules. 
• 
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛽(𝑡) ∙ 𝑈,                                      (2) 
 
U(t+j) is calculated using β(t+j), which in turns is modeled 
as some function fβ of the Developer Income I(t)  at time t:  
 
1 MoE in the diagram stands for Medium of Exchange and refers to any 
arbitrary currency, fiat or crypto, other than XNS tokens 
2 As with Foundation Treasury size, XNS price movements are a function of 
complex interaction between state variables. As again with Foundation 
Treasury size, most of the variables that affect XNS prices are outside of the 
scope of the subsidy excerpt, and so we chose not to discuss simulation of 
price movements in this paper. 
• 𝛽(𝑡 + 𝑗) = 𝑓𝛽(𝐼(𝑡)).                                       (3) 
 
App Dev 
Income 
The Application Developer Income (in XNS) at time t, I(t), 
is the sum of App Subsidy received by time t and the number 
of applications * c, the average cost of an app. 
• 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝐴0 − 𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈(𝑡).                                   (4) 
Found-
ation 
Treasury 
Size 
The size of the Foundation Treasury at time t, T(t), is 
dependent on App Subsidy Pool as well as other state 
variables such as Capacity Subsidy and Platform Fees that 
are outside the scope of the subsidy pool excerpt. Moreover, 
just as how App Dev Income at t is used to update 
parameters for Number of Apps, T(t) is used to calculate 
various parameters for variables such as Capacity Subsidy 
and Platform Fees. f(t) is an arbitrary function of these out-
of-the scope variables and g(t) is an arbitrary function of A(t) 
and f(t). Parameters for other state variables at t+j are used in 
functions of T(t). 
• 𝑇(𝑡) = 𝑔(𝐴(𝑡), 𝑓(𝑡)).                                    (5) 
 
 
D. Simulation Runs 
App Usage Parameter No and β(0), and App Subsidy 
Parameters Ao and  from  Table II were the input variables into 
the simulation. Of these, the key decision variable is Ao as that 
reflects a policy decision:  How much should Insolar initially 
commit to subsidize Application Developers to develop apps on 
their platform? 
TABLE III.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Initial Reward Pool 
Size in XNS (Ao) 
Decay 
Rate
3
 () 
Time 
Steps
4
 
Monte Carlo 
Runs 
250 x 10e6 0.0005 3652 100 
500 x 10e6 0.0005 3652 100 
750 x 10e6 0.0005 3652 100 
1000 x 10e6 0.0005 3652 100 
 
The simulations were carried out in a Monte Carlo fashion 
using four possible scenarios for the starting reward pool size 
and means of affected state variables – Number of Apps (App 
Usage), App Dev Income, and Foundation Treasury Size – were 
computed. The decay rate was kept constant throughout these 
experiments, as were the numbers of simulated time steps, and 
Monte Carlo runs.   
E. Simulation Results 
Depletion from the Application Subsidy Pool (top panel, 
Figure 4) confirms the expected exponential decay in token 
distribution as well as the pattern resulting from the change in 
initial starting reward pool size. The resulting XNS token 
 
3 Additional experiments were run during the Insolar economic parameter 
design and validation research, including but not limited to exploring the 
effects of varying the decay rate.  
4 Steps in the simulation are in 1 day increments up to 3,652 days or 10 years 
distribution to the Application Developers (bottom panel, Figure 
4) can be seen in the figure as well. This again is intuitively 
reasonable given the described model and varying initial reward 
pool size. 
 
 
Figure 4: Subsidy – From Pool and To Developers 
Interestingly, the net effect on Application Developer 
Income (top panel, Figure 5) is less intuitive. It shows that in the 
long run Application Developers receive similar incomes 
regardless of the initial size of the subsidy pool. There appears 
to be a complex and non-linear relationship between the initial 
subsidy pool size and reward value delivered to Application 
Developers. 
The initial reward pool size also has an interesting effect on 
the value of the tokens held by the Insolar Foundation. 
Predictably, the Foundation’s holdings of XNS tokens vary 
inversely with initial application subsidy pool size. However, 
due to complex behaviors (from simulation runs related to but 
outside the scope of the subsidy excerpt), the value of tokens 
held by the Foundation does increase as initial subsidy pool size 
is increased (bottom panel, Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Subsidy Effect on Application Developer Income and 
Foundation Treasury 
F. Simulation Insights 
The key insight from this simulation is that the Application 
Subsidy has a positive effect on Foundation Treasury; that is, the 
larger the initial pool of funds for the Application Subsidy, the 
larger the eventual size of the Foundation Treasury. If we 
assume that the growth of the treasury is a reasonable byproduct 
of the success of the platform, the simulation results point to the 
Application Subsidy as having the desired effect of helping 
platform growth. The results warrant recommending a policy of 
seeding the Subsidy Pool with significant amount of XNS 
tokens. 
The direct overall benefit to Application Developers is less 
clear. Even if more XNS tokens are granted to Application 
Developers through the subsidy, the net effect on them is not 
guaranteed at every point in time. Application Developers pay 
Application Platform and Resource Platform fees in XNS tokens 
and these grow at some rate, yet the rate at which they receive 
subsidies decays. Ultimately, the Insolar Foundation reaps the 
reward from this mismatch of accelerating fee revenues and 
decelerating subsidy outlays. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To summarize, given the increasing role of cryptocurrencies 
– especially in light of recent announcements of corporate 
cryptocurrencies from Facebook, JP Morgan, and Walmart [31] 
– we determine that the topic of token economics is under-
researched. This paper presents excerpts of the token 
engineering process to demonstrate how simulation modelling 
informed policy design for Insolar’s subsidy pool – their 
mechanism to incentivize application providers to develop more 
applications onto the public MainNet. Simulation results point 
to investment into the subsidy pool as having a desirable positive 
effect that helps MainNet growth. The insights from modeling 
will be important as Insolar tries to foster a vibrant ecosystem of 
application developers and computing resource providers that 
will entice individual and enterprise users to join the MainNet 
after launch. 
For this brief paper, a fuller exploration of theoretical issues 
was beyond our scope. We did not delve much into the formal 
control theory underlying these simulation models, nor did we 
relate much to traditional literature on market design from 
Economics and Operations Research. Moreover, though always 
a pressing issue for blockchain-based systems, we did not 
address security issues as bounding of our scope entailed 
assuming security breaches to the MainNet to be exogenous 
events that our simulation does not factor in. Regardless of these 
limitations, for a fledgling startup like Insolar, their future 
success will in no small part hinge upon how well their model 
incentivizes various stakeholders to participate on their MainNet 
network versus that of numerous alternatives. We believe that 
providing visibility to such a strategic and academically novel 
exercise serves a contribution to the research community. 
Practically, Insolar is also interested in future work that more 
granularly examines application subsidies, namely the mix of 
spending between these subsidy types: 
• App Seeding entails incentivizing application creation 
events such as “code jams” or “hackathons.” 
• New Application Subsidy is offered for newly deployed 
applications, with the subsidy decreasing to 0 the 
developer after an “introductory discount” time. 
• A Volume Resource Subsidy is meant to ease the 
resources costs incurred by developers of popular 
applications. 
• A Success Reward is awarded to Application 
Developers for meeting strategic Key Performance 
Indicators, as determined by the Insolar Foundation. 
The simulation model required for determining this mix 
needs to build upon and extend the work presented in this paper. 
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